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Mutual Fund Incentive Fees: Determinants and Effects 
 
We investigate the how and why of performance fee provisions in a free contracting 
environment such as the Italian mutual fund market was until 2006. We find weak support 
for the hypothesis that these provisions emerge as an economically efficient solution in a 
rational asset management industry plagued by asymmetric information. They appear to 
emerge mainly as the product of strategic pricing by asset managers wishing to ease market 
competition, leverage on investors’ sentiment, and hedge their cost structure. Alternatively, 
fears that managers may opportunistically alter funds’ investment policies to maximize the 
option value embedded in the incentive provisions appear unjustified. 
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I. Introduction 
 The reward scheme for asset managers often consists of both management fees and 
performance fees. The former are set as a percentage of the assets under management 
(AUM); the latter are a function of the realized return on the managed portfolio.  
 Hedge fund managers usually earn performance fees on the total realized return. For 
mutual fund managers, performance fees are typically calculated as a percentage of the 
differential between their portfolio return and a hurdle variable
1
. If the hurdle variable is the 
return on a pre-specified normal portfolio defining the investment objective of the fund 
(benchmark), the performance fee is a percentage of the fund’s active return. If the hurdle 
variable is a proxy of the risk-free rate (an interbank interest rate or a return on an index of 
treasury bills), the performance fee is a percentage of the fund’s excess return. In some 
instances, the hurdle variable is set as a constant worth a few percentage points, referred to as 
the hurdle rate.  
 Performance fees may be either symmetrical (fulcrum fees) or asymmetrical (bonus 
plan). With fulcrum fees, a manager who outperforms the hurdle variable receives a 
proportion of the positive differential, while they suffer a symmetrical deduction from the 
management fee in the case of under performance. Bonus plans, instead, reward out 
performance without penalizing under performance and offer fund managers an option-like 
payoff. 
 The literature on incentive fees offers insights into their influence on managers’ 
investment choices (Carpenter, 2000; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2003), on their optimal 
structure in terms of social welfare maximization (Das and Sundaram, 2002), on their pros 
and cons as a tool to manage the agency problem arising between investors and managers, the 
                                                 
1
 Evans (2008) analyzes the incentive effect of mutual fund manager’s personal fund investment. In case of 
direct investment, of course, the incentive is based on the fund total return. 
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screening problem of separating good managers from bad, and the signaling problem of 
conveying credibly any informational advantages managers may possess (Admati and 
Pfeiderer, 1997; Stremme, 1999; Cuoco and Kaniel, 2000). 
 These contributions are mainly theoretical since an amendment to the Investment 
Company Act enacted in 1970 made it illegal in the U.S. for mutual fund managers to charge 
asymmetric performance fees. Since then, only a handful of U.S. managers have been brave 
enough to adopt fulcrum fees. Almost everyone opted for a reward scheme based on 
management fees only, depriving researchers of the data needed for a meaningful empirical 
investigation into the compensation structure of mutual fund managers agreed upon by 
investors in a free contracting environment. 
 In this paper, we overcome the problem of missing data by investigating the Italian 
mutual fund industry. Until the end of 2006, it was free from relevant regulatory constraints 
on any compensation scheme fund managers might set.
2
 This free contracting environment 
for mutual funds’ incentive provisions allows us to build a unique database to address the two 
major empirical issues concerning managers’ pay for performance compensation. 
 First, we investigate the rationale behind the use of incentive fees. The dominant 
hypothesis in the economic literature suggests performance fees are either a signaling device 
(Spence, 1973) which fund managers exploit to advertise their ability, or an optimal 
contracting rule (Holmstrom, 1979) meant to offer managers appropriate incentives to 
prevent the risk of moral hazard. Following a more managerial perspective, however, we 
suggest it is worth considering a further rationale for setting performance fees. That is to 
weaken price competition among managers through a less transparent and harder to compare 
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 As of January 2007, all Italian mutual funds must comply with a much tighter regulation on incentive fee 
schemes aimed at avoiding the risk that these provisions end up rewarding volatility rather than performance. 
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pricing policy. We then assess the relative explanatory power each approach has for this 
issue. 
 Second, we compare the dynamics of portfolio returns for funds with and without 
incentive provisions to verify whether asset managers, with their compensation tied to 
performance, opportunistically adjust their portfolio decisions to optimize the value of the 
option embedded in the bonus plan to which they are entitled, thus pushing the risk-return 
profile of their fund far from the optimal one. This possibility, first suggested by Starks 
(1987) and Cohen and Starks (1988), has not yet been fully tested. To the best of our 
knowledge, its only empirical investigation is in the noteworthy work of Golec and Starks 
(2004), which studies the change in fund behavior caused by the banning of asymmetric fees 
in the U.S. in 1971. We exploit the opportunities offered by the free contracting environment 
of Italy until 2006 to assess, in more detail, both the types of moral hazard risk which may 
originate from the manager reward scheme and how material they can be in practice. In fact, 
this risk may be not as great as a straightforward standard option theory would suggest. In 
contrast with a standard call option holder, the manager rewarded with a bonus plan is not 
facing a purely asymmetric payoff. Opportunistic behavior leaves them exposed to a relevant 
downside risk in terms of the potential loss of reputational capital and of the possible 
shrinking base of their AUM. 
 In investigating the possible rationale for adopting an incentive provision, we find that 
with no major regulatory constraints set on the compensation structure for mutual fund 
managers this choice strongly depends on the type of fund managed. About nine out of ten 
equity funds charge performance fees; whereas, just one in two bond funds do. The 
percentage drops even further among money market funds (less than one in ten charges such 
a fee). This cross-sectional evidence lends some support to the theory of incentive provisions 
as an optimal contracting device. According to Holmstrom (1979), when the agent’s action is 
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not observable, but can only be inferred from the final outcome, the first best risk-sharing 
compensation scheme is not viable as it doesn’t produce sufficient incentive for the agent to 
exert extra effort. Under these conditions, the compensation agreement is usually a second 
best solution where the agent bears a certain level of risk owing to a performance-linked 
compensation. On a related issue, Gaver and Gaver (1995) find a similar result demonstrating 
that executives in firms with abundant investment opportunities receive a larger proportion of 
their compensation from long-term incentive tools such as restricted stock grants and stock 
options grants. 
 We also find that in a free contracting environment, there is an overwhelming 
preference for some form of bonus plan over fulcrum fees. The latter never occurs in our 
sample, casting serious doubts over the signaling function sometimes assigned to 
performance fee provisions. To be credible and reliable, a signal has to be costly to send, 
even more so for the "bad type" of manager. Fulcrum fees would, in that instance, be much 
more effective than bonus plans. Yet they seem to appeal to no one. Moreover, performance 
fees prove to be ineffective in discriminating good from bad managers. In certain fund 
categories, this type of provision is almost universally used, permitting no discrimination 
between competing products. In other categories, funds with performance fees fail to show 
better performance when compared with directly competing funds without them. 
 Our empirical findings provide full support for the managerial perspective that sees 
the incentive provisions as the outcome of strategic pricing policies pursued by the fund 
managers. The cost and the ownership structure of the investment companies, as well as the 
investors’ sentiment, the size of the funds, and the size of the investment companies, carry 
strong explanatory power regarding the presence of incentive provisions across funds. 
 In investigating the possibility that managers with compensation tied to performance 
act opportunistically, we find no evidence for any of the three moral hazard risks that 
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regulators fear: 1) funds with an incentive provision are no riskier than similar funds without 
it, 2) managers do not alter the risk profile of their funds according to the realized 
performance while approaching the incentive fee calculation date, and 3) investment 
companies managing a portfolio of funds with similar mandates do not lower their funds’ 
correlations to stabilize their stream of income from performance fees. It may well be the 
case that the risk of losing reputational capital and a shrinking base of AUM offsets the desire 
to exploit opportunistically the option-like payoff created by the incentive provision. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses how Italian funds charge 
incentive fees according to the industry practice. Section III outlines the presence of incentive 
provisions in the Italian mutual fund industry. Section IV introduces the logistic models used 
to analyze why funds charge incentive fees and details the proposed explanatory variables. 
Section V explains the results. Section VI investigates the effects of incentive fees on fund 
managers’ investment choices, assessing how material the moral hazard risk is. Section VII 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
II. The Structure of Asymmetric Incentive Fees 
 An asset manager charging both a management and an asymmetric performance fee 
earns: 
 
 0;10 KRRMaxaaAF bp   (1) 
 
where AF is the total payoff for the manager, a0 is the management fee, a1 is the participation 
rate, Rp is the fund return, Rb is the benchmark return (or the change in any other pre-
specified hurdle variable), and K is the return in excess of the hurdle variable needed to claim 
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the right to a performance fee. K is often set equal to zero, allowing the manager to collect a 
performance fee whenever fund returns exceed the reference portfolio returns. 
 This payoff is proportional to the payoff of an option offering the right to exchange 
the reference portfolio for the fund portfolio (spread option) with a scale factor equal to the 
participation rate. Option theory provides useful insights for estimation of the value of these 
compensation schemes. It stops short, though, of providing a perfect pricing since there is no 
possibility of hedging the underlying position on a frictionless market. 
 Since compensation schemes with asymmetric performance fees amount to option 
claims, their value to managers, as well as their cost to investors, is an increasing function of 
the underlying asset’s volatility. In our case, it is the volatility of the spread between the fund 
portfolio return and the reference portfolio return (herein referred to as spread volatility). 
 Should the reference portfolio consist of the risk-free asset only, the spread volatility 
becomes the fund volatility itself. The same holds true if no hurdle variable is set. When the 
fund benchmark is chosen as the reference portfolio, the spread volatility becomes the fund’s 
tracking error which is a measure of the relative risk (with respect to the benchmark) a 
manager accepts in order to generate positive active returns (Gupta, Prajogi, and Stubbs, 
1999), as well as a tool for both an ex post performance evaluation and an ex ante definition 
of the fund’s investment policies (Blitz and Hottinga, 2001). 
 It may appear strange that investors agree to a compensation scheme based on a rule 
that rewards the risk of the fund, either in an absolute or in a relative form. Managers may 
consciously pursue investment policies that widen the spread volatility to raise the value of 
their performance fees. Starks (1987) demonstrates that a symmetric fee strictly dominates a 
bonus plan in giving the manager the incentive to assume the optimal risk level for the 
investors. The asymmetric fee, shading the manager from the downside of a bad performance, 
induces excessive risk-taking. 
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 This moral hazard risk is not as large as it seems. In contrast with a standard call 
option holder, the manager remains exposed to a downside risk in terms of the loss of 
reputational capital and lower management fee income due to a shrinking AUM base. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) prove that past performances are 
positively correlated with future fund inflows. Since the management fee is proportional to 
AUM, larger tracking errors increase the probability of poor performance relative to the 
benchmark, putting at risk the growth of the fund and the related manager’s income. Fund 
rankings published in the press amplify the risk (Goodwin, 1998; Goriaev, Palomino, and 
Prat, 2000). According to Chevalier and Ellison (1999), managers working for investment 
companies are concerned about their career prospects. In the case of poor performers, they 
may be fired or have their career cut short with an ensuing depreciation of their human 
capital. 
 Even though managers remain exposed to some downside risk, the fear that 
asymmetrical incentive fees still provide them with an inappropriate incentive for tilting their 
investment strategies toward excessive risk prompted the U.S. Congress to forbid bonus plans 
and to allow only fulcrum fees. A variety of bonus plans spring from the structure shown in 
Equation (1). As an example, in the regulatory environment we analyze, managers are not 
allowed to collect performance fees if the return on the fund is negative, regardless of the 
active return generated by the manager.
3
 To comply with this regulation, the fee structure 
must set a lower limit equal to zero either on the fund return or on the benchmark return, 
making the manager’s payoff respectively equal either to: 
 
 0;10 KRRdMaxaaAF bp   (2) 
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 See Bank of Italy Supervisory Bulletin No. 7, 1998 and No. 4, 2001. For the Regulator, incentive fees should 
be charged only if the performance is satisfying for the investors, and a negative return never qualifies as such. 
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or 
 
  0 1 ; 0 ; 0p bAF a a Max R Max R K     (3) 
 
where a0 is the management fee and d is a binary variable worth one if Rp > 0 and zero if 
otherwise. 
 In both cases, the regulatory constraint is satisfied with K  0. Since the manager 
cannot benefit from incentive fees when portfolio returns are less negative than benchmark 
returns, both schemes are worth less than the standard scheme in Equation (1). The structure 
in Equation (3) is less generous to the manager than that of Equation (2) since it allows the 
manager to earn the incentive fee only if the returns on both the benchmark and the fund are 
positive. The structure in Equation (2) only requires the fund return to be positive. 
 A second variation on the basic structure sets the participation rate according to a 
rising scale that is dependent upon the fund return in excess of the reference portfolio return 
(step-by-step incentive fee). This could happen should the participation rate be set at 10% 
when the active return falls between 1%-2%, at 20% if it falls between 2%-3% and at 30% if 
it exceeds 3%. The payoff of a step-by-step asymmetric performance fee is similar to the 
payoff of a portfolio of binary (digital) spread options. 
 An additional type of incentive scheme sets a ceiling on the manager’s payoff. 
Whenever this happens, the manager is long in a bull spread strategy. Its value is less exposed 
to changes in the spread volatility than is the value of a corresponding asymmetrical fee 
without any upper bound on the payoff. 
 The value of a bonus plan is also highly dependent on the reference period set for its 
calculation. Incentive fees are synchronous if the calculation period matches the period 
between two successive payment dates. A synchronous quarterly fee is paid four times a year 
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on the basis of the excess return earned in each quarter. Incentive fees are asynchronous if 
their calculation period is different from their payment cycle (e.g., when the fee is paid 
quarterly based on the annual performance ending on the day when the payment is due). In 
our sample, we find both asynchronous and synchronous performance fee provisions with a 
calculation period ranging from one month to a full calendar year. Drago, Lazzari, and 
Navone (2008) illustrate how, ceteris paribus, the value of an incentive provision is higher 
when the fees are asynchronous and the calculation period is shorter. 
 The following citation, taken from the prospectus of a family of Italian funds managed 
by Pioneer Investment (the investment company of Unicredit Group) refers to an annual 
synchronous performance fee and reads as follows (adapted from the original Italian text): 
 
The investment company is entitled to perceive the performance fee whenever 
the change in the value of a fund unit exceeds the change in the Banca 
Fideuram Index of the corresponding category of funds
4
. The performance fee 
is equal to 25% of the above mentioned excess return and is paid by the fund 
on the first working day following the end of the yearly calculation period. To 
this end, during each year, the investment company proceeds on a daily basis 
to calculate the return on the reference index since the previous year-end and 
to compare it with the corresponding return recorded by each fund’s unit at the 
end of each trading day. 
 
This quote underlines an important feature of the incentive fee mechanism shared by the 
Italian funds until 2006, the non-cumulative property of the realized fund return and of the 
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 The Banca Fideuram Indices are informative regarding the mean return earned by all Italian funds of any given 
category. 
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hurdle variable. Neither of them is carried over from one calculation period to the next.
5
 
Whenever a new period starts (start date), the calculation procedure loses its memory of any 
past under performances of the fund with respect to the hurdle variable. The exchange option 
implied by the provision is always reset to be at the money on each start date.
6
 
 The asset manager may be paid the incentive fee for any calculation period when, in 
fact, the cumulative performance of the fund from the subscription date till the redemption 
date falls short of the cumulative change in the hurdle variable and may even be negative. In 
fact, let’s suppose the fund realizes a negative return of 8% and under performs the hurdle 
variable by 5% in the first calculation period that an investor is in the fund. The manager 
would not collect a performance fee. In the subsequent calculation period, however, he does 
so even if the fund records a positive return of just 4% and recovers only three of the five 
percentage points return shortfall recorded in the previous period with respect to the hurdle 
variable. Despite a realized holding period return of -4.32% and a 2% overall under 
performance, this investor still rewards the manager with a performance fee. 
 The above citation also indicates that performance fees are charged to the fund on a 
daily basis. At the end of each trading day, the incentive fee is computed on the cumulative 
fund performance recorded since the beginning of the current calculation period. This amount 
is charged to the fund and recorded as one of its liabilities (negative accrual), lowering the net 
asset value (NAV) at which its shares can be subscribed or redeemed. The process is repeated 
daily until the last day of the calculation period (calculation date) when the fund settles its 
debt by paying the manager the performance fees accrued over the period. In fact, the next 
passage of the cited prospectus reads as follows: 
 
                                                 
5
 This prompted the Bank of Italy to introduce tighter regulations on incentive fees. 
6
 Should the provision set a fixed hurdle rate, at any start date the call option would be reset at the same out of 
the money level. 
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On the basis of this difference (fund return minus reference index return), the 
investment company calculates the performance fee it is entitled to and 
compares it with the corresponding sum accrued over the preceding days. 
Should a positive difference emerge, it would be debited to the fund, while 
should it be negative, it would be credited to the fund. 
 
 In the free contracting environment of the Italian mutual fund industry, two 
methodologies are used to deal with the interim flows of new subscriptions between two 
consecutive calculation dates in quantifying the incentive fee due to the manager. Because of 
the "mutual" attribute of these pooled investment vehicles, the fee is accrued for each unit 
based on the performance of the unit from the relevant start date and not from its subscription 
date. While some funds may quantify the total incentive fee for which they are liable by 
multiplying this unit fee by the number of units outstanding on the calculation date (point 
calculation method), other funds base the calculation on either the daily average value of the 
AUM or the daily average number of shares outstanding during the whole calculation period 
(averaging calculation method). With the former procedure, even fund shares issued on the 
day preceding the calculation date are liable for the fee due for the performance delivered 
over the entire calculation period. On those shares, therefore, the manager would be rewarded 
for a performance that was not delivered. This problem is mitigated, but does not disappear, if 
the latter procedure is adopted. 
 Thus, the payoff of a performance fee provision is sensitive to the combined effect of 
three interacting variables: 1) the time profile of the fund interim net inflows, 2) the time 
distribution of the return realized by the fund during the calculation period, and 3) the 
calculation procedure used to take into account the changing number of fund units 
outstanding. 
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III. Incentive Fees in the Italian Mutual Fund Industry 
 The reference universe for our analysis consists of 970 mutual funds chartered in Italy 
and active at the end of 2004. Their assets amount to € 357,255 billion with an average of € 
368 million of AUM for each fund. They are managed by 51 investment companies 
incorporated according to Italian law as società di gestione del risparmio (SGR). 
 We build our database by combining two different sources. The first one is 
MoneyMate, one of the leading providers of mutual fund data for many European countries 
and the only survivorship bias-free database for the Italian market. Return on market indices 
used as hurdle variables by the funds with incentive fees are obtained from Datastream. 
Information on the fee structure is hand collected from the funds’ prospectuses. 
 Most of the investment companies are part of larger banking or insurance groups that 
sell fund shares directly to the public. Two of them are jointly owned by several cooperative 
banks that take care of the distribution through their network of branches. The remaining 
companies (called "independent"), raise capital for the funds they manage through either a 
distribution agreement with third parties (banks and independent financial advisors) or direct 
sales. 
 Panels A and B of 
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Table I illustrate how investment companies that belong to banking groups dominate the 
market. They manage 81.8% (89.5% when the companies jointly owned by the cooperative 
banks are also taken into consideration) of the AUM by the whole industry and are 
responsible for 68.1% of the funds registered in Italy. 
 
Insert Table I about here. 
 
 When they are compared with their competitors, their offerings are skewed toward 
funds specializing in fixed income products (money market and bond funds), as well as 
toward hybrid funds. They maintain, instead, a smaller fraction of their AUM in equity and 
total return funds. 
 Panel C of 
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Table I indicates the size of the management fee. Across the entire population of funds it 
averages 1.46%, ranging from a mean of 0.55% among the money market funds to a mean of 
1.88% among the equity funds. Funds managed by independent investment companies tend to 
charge lower management fees than other funds of comparable type. 
 Performance fee provisions are usually justified on the grounds of economic 
efficiency in an asymmetric information environment either as an optimal contracting device 
to elicit the manager’s best effort, or as a signaling device to allow the public to separate 
good managers from bad managers. In this paper we suggest an alternative hypothesis: from a 
managerial perspective, we believe they should be regarded as part of a rational pricing 
strategy profit-maximizing investment companies implement in order to increase their 
revenue and to soften price competition having regard to their cost and ownership structure, 
to the securities market conditions and to their market power 
 Should incentive provisions serve mainly as an optimal contracting device between 
the risk-neutral principals and a risk-averse agent in an asymmetric information environment, 
compensation would be made more dependent on realized performance (e.g., the agent has 
more opportunity to determine performance). Otherwise, the marginal benefit of providing 
the agent with the incentive to exert an unobservable effort would be more than offset by the 
marginal cost of giving up the first best optimal risk-sharing solution consisting of a flat 
reward. 
 In the mutual fund industry, investors may be thought of as risk-neutral principals, 
assuming their wealth is fully diversified. Fund managers are better seen as risk-averse agents 
since much of their income is tied up in their professional activity. The correlation among the 
assets included in the fund’s investable universe acts as proxy for the power of active 
management to determine portfolio performance. The more correlated their returns are, the 
lower the gain from fostering the manager’s effort when compared with the cost of giving up 
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optimal risk-sharing through performance pay. If so, incentive fees should be the standard 
among equity funds and total return funds, where more is to be gained from proper stock 
picking and market timing ability. They should be less common among hybrid funds and 
bond funds and should be the least popular among money market funds. 
 The Italian mutual fund industry fits the pattern suggested by the optimal contracting 
hypothesis. Table II offers a breakdown of our fund population according to their investment 
specialization as defined by Assogestioni, the trade association of Italian investment 
companies. 
 
Insert Table II about here. 
 
 At the end of 2004, 672 of the 970 existing funds charged incentive fees. While 
accounting for 69.3% of the total number of active funds, they were responsible for just 48% 
of the total AUM by the industry. They all employed some form of bonus plan. No fulcrum 
fee scheme was found. 
 More than eight out of ten equity funds and total return funds charge performance 
fees. The same holds for just two out of three hybrid funds and for one out of two bond funds. 
Performance fees are rare among money market funds; only one out of ten charges them. 
 There is just one piece of evidence from the Italian market that we find hard to explain 
within the efficient contracting framework. With the exception of total return funds, in Italy 
all mutual funds must state in their prospectus their normal portfolio, or benchmark, to let 
current and potential subscribers identify the risk/return profile the manager is deemed 
responsible for providing. We would then expect incentive fees to be set as a function of the 
realized portfolio returns in excess of the benchmark’s return. Instead, only three out of four 
funds with a bonus plan follow this practice. The remaining 25% charge incentive fees on the 
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portfolio return exceeding the value of a hurdle variable unrelated to the investment task the 
manager is contractually obliged to perform, such as 1) the average rate of return of all other 
funds in the same Assogestioni category that usually groups together funds with different 
investment styles (i.e., equity funds specializing in large cap value stock and equity funds 
specializing in small cap growth stocks), 2) either the return on an index of treasury bills and 
notes or the Euribor rate intended as a proxy of a risk-free rate often increased by a few 
percentage points representing a fair risk premium, 3) the return realized by the fund itself 
‘N’ periods earlier, and 4) the rate of inflation, as measured by the consumer price index. 
 All else being equal, these reward schemes increase the value of the manager’s 
compensation since the return on a fund is less correlated with the above mentioned variables 
than with its own benchmark. It is surprising that investors find acceptable compensation 
schemes unrelated to the investment objective contractually agreed upon. They allow 
managers to collect performance fees that reward the risk borne by the fund rather than the 
manager’s ability and effort. 
 The economic literature on mutual funds also suggests that incentive fees may serve 
as a signaling device used by investment companies with superior management ability to 
separate themselves from the others and enjoy a larger net inflow of capital. If so, for each 
category group we should expect to find this type of provision only in a fraction of the 
competing funds. There would be no reason to expect a great variation of this fraction across 
category groups. This is not the case in Italy. Performance fees are an almost universal trait 
among equity funds, total return funds, and hybrid funds failing to act as an effective 
separating device. 
 According to the signaling hypothesis, funds with incentive provisions should deliver 
better performance on average and attract a larger inflow of capital, standing out by virtue of 
their larger asset size when compared with similar funds with no such provision. Elton et al. 
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(2003) found that among U.S. bond and stock mutual funds, those charging incentive fees 
make up less than 2% of the total, but account for more than 10% of the AUM by the industry 
and deliver a marginally superior risk-adjusted performance. The evidence from the Italian 
market does not lend similar support to the signaling hypothesis. Among equity, hybrid, and 
total return funds, those with a performance fee do not appear to grow significantly larger 
than those without it. They account for 83% of the population in the equity group, 67% in the 
hybrid group, and 83% in the total return group. They claim 87%, 72%, and 80% of the total 
AUM by their respective categories. In the bond and money market categories, as Table II 
indicates, funds with incentive fees fail to attract cash inflow and remain smaller in size than 
the others. While 9.1% of money market funds and 52.6% of bond funds charge performance 
fees, they are responsible for just 3.8% and 45.7% of the total AUM by their respective 
category group. 
 The divergent evidence provided by the U.S. and the Italian experiences of the role of 
incentive provision as a suitable signal used by good managers to single themselves out most 
probably depends on the different regulatory settings concerning fund managers’ 
compensation. While U.S. securities law requires incentive fees to take the form of fulcrum 
fees, in the Italian setting that we analyze, managers can freely opt either for fulcrum fees or 
for bonus plans. Fulcrum fees (which penalize underachievers) strictly dominate bonus plans 
(which don’t) as a signaling tool for managers. Yet, taking advantage of milder regulations, 
all Italian managers opt for bonus plans over fulcrum fees, showing little concern regarding 
the effectiveness of their compensation scheme as a signaling tool. In a free contracting 
environment, performance fee provisions do not prove to be a useful tool to reach a 
separating equilibrium in which good and bad managers can be correctly identified. 
 The performance fee is a contingent reward. As we discuss in a companion paper 
(Drago et al., 2008), the value of an incentive provision is highly sensitive to many 
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apparently minor technical details (participation rate, hurdle variable, and frequency of 
computation), the relevance of which the man in the street finds hard to understand and 
compare ex ante across competing products. When compared with a management fee, an 
incentive provision makes it more difficult for investors to rank fund products according to 
their cost. Thus, we suggest that performance fees may be better understood as part of a 
strategic pricing policy. Profit-maximizing managers aim to increase their revenue stream by 
softening price competition and exploiting investors’ market sentiment, while giving proper 
consideration to their market power and cost structure. 
 Incentive provisions make the pricing more opaque for the typical mutual fund 
customer who is often an unsophisticated retail investor, as revealed by an Assogestioni 
report (2005). Over 70% of the assets invested in Italian mutual funds come from retail 
investors. Forty percent  of Italian families own mutual fund shares and 53% of investors 
allocate to mutual funds less than €15,000. In our companion paper, we also found the 
average option value of performance provisions across our equity fund population to be 
0.43% of the AUM on an annual basis. It accounts for one-fifth of the equity fund manager 
total compensation. The remaining four-fifths are due to the management fee. 
 The evidence from the Italian market lends some prima facie support for this 
managerial view. While both hypotheses based on economic efficiency suggest a certain 
degree of substitution between management and performance fees, should the managerial 
interpretation prevail, we would not expect, on average, to find lower management fees in 
funds that also charge performance fees. 
 Table III provides evidence that Italian fund managers are unwilling to give up part of 
their management fees in exchange for collecting performance fees. 
 
Insert Table III about here. 
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 In most categories, the average management fee is not significantly different when 
compared to funds with and without incentive fees. The t-test rejects the hypothesis of equal 
average management fees between the two groups only for the bond fund category. Even 
worse, bond funds charging incentive fees are significantly more expensive than similar 
funds with no equivalent performance pay. 
 Should the performance fee serve as a strategic pricing tool used by managers to 
increase their profitability, we may expect its occurrence to depend on the ownership 
structure of the investment companies. The companies owned by a consortium of mutual 
banks should show the lowest propensity to offer funds with performance fees since they lack 
a strong drive toward profit maximization. Conversely, should the performance fee be the 
optimal economic solution to a contracting problem or to a selection problem, the ownership 
structure of the investment company would play no role in the decision to adopt such a 
provision. 
 The evidence from the Italian market fits the managerial perspective better than the 
economic perspective. Investment companies owned by mutual banks charge performance 
fees in only 25% of the funds they manage. This percentage reaches almost 90% among 
investment companies labeled as independent and hovers around 70% among those that 
belong to banks and insurance groups. Independent investment companies charge incentive 
fees in most of the funds they manage regardless of their investment objective, while 
investment companies owned by banks and insurance companies do so only in a minority of 
bond funds and in a tiny fraction of money market funds. 
 
IV. Logistic Models for Incentive Fee Provisions 
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 To investigate further how evidence from the Italian market fits with different 
hypotheses regarding the rationale for incentive fees, we develop five logistic models. In each 
of them, the dependent variable is set equal to one if the fund charges a performance fee and 
to zero otherwise. 
 These models encompass a list of 21 potential explanatory variables suggested either 
by the managerial perspective of strategic pricing behavior or by the economic perspective of 
efficient contracting and optimal signaling. From the managerial perspective, the list of 
relevant variables is as follows. 
 The size of the fund, LOG(SIZE), as measured by the natural log of its assets is a 
variable to be considered. Being a proxy of how well established the fund is, it may be a 
measure of the pricing power the fund enjoys. As such, it could increase the probability that 
funds charge incentive fees without cutting their management fees. It is also possible, 
however, to claim the opposite; that a larger fund size may allow a more favorable pricing of 
asset management services thanks to economies of scale. 
 The size of the investment company, as measured by the logarithm of its AUM, is 
LOG(IC_SIZE). Two concurrent factors may be at work here. First, being a proxy of either 
the market power or the economies of scale that the investment company enjoys, 
LOG(IC_SIZE) may be the object of the same conflicting claims applicable to the fund size 
variable. Secondly, since larger investment companies manage a larger number of funds, they 
can expect to earn a more stable stream of total revenue from performance fees due to a 
diversification effect. Thus, they unequivocally find this type of reward more appealing than 
small investment companies do. 
 Another relevant variable is the fees the investment company pays to its distribution 
channels normalized with respect to its total AUM. We consider both the fees rewarding the 
placement of new fund shares (SALES_FEE) and the fees paid annually for securing the 
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preservation of a good relationship with current clients, labeled as maintenance fees 
(MAINT_FEES).  The higher these costs, the higher should be the incentive for risk-averse 
managers to shift their compensation away from the greater uncertainty of the performance 
fee and toward the relatively more stable management fee. To account for the possibility that 
distribution costs are directly charged to investors through loads, the variable SALES_FEE is 
defined as the gross expense the investment company pays for distribution services minus the 
loads it earns. We further control for the presence of loads by adding as an explanatory 
variable a dummy (D_LOAD) equal to one for load funds and equal to zero for no loads.
7
 In 
theory, we should expect load funds to show a higher propensity to rely on performance fees 
when compared with no loads since their distribution costs are, at least in part, directly paid 
by the investors. 
 The ownership structure of the investment company as measured by a series of 
dummy variables, D_INS, D_IND, and D_CONS, assuming a value of one whenever the 
company is part of an insurance group, is independent, or belongs to a consortium of mutual 
banks is another important variable. The default case, then, relates to investment companies 
belonging to banking groups. Since the stronger the profit motive, the higher the probability 
of finding performance fees, we expect a negative coefficient for the variable D_CONS 
because of the mutual ultimate ownership and a positive coefficient for the variable D_IND, 
the asset management being the only core business activity of an independent investment 
company. We would also expect a positive coefficient for D_IND should a scale factor be at 
work. Independent investment companies lack the extensive proprietary distribution networks 
                                                 
7
 Reading the prospectuses, we learn that 51.7% of the funds in our sample charge a front load and 17.7% a 
deferred load. Since these two groups of funds partially overlap, load funds account for 58.8% of the population. 
Most of them belong to the equity or total return category. Nonetheless, loads do not appear to be an 
economically important mechanism to make investors bear the distribution costs of fund shares. For the whole 
industry, revenue raised from loads is just 8.1% of the expenses paid to the distribution network for placing fund 
shares. Almost half of the funds with a deferred load offer partial or full load waivers depending on the length of 
the stay in the fund. Most of the funds charging a front load offer either partial or full load waivers should the 
size of the subscription exceed a stated amount. 
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that their competitors belonging to large banking and insurance companies can count on. 
Hence, they need to leverage more on performance fees and less on management fees to 
profit from successful performances. Since there is no a priori reason to expect any difference 
in the strategic pricing behavior of investment companies belonging to insurance and banking 
groups, we expect the coefficient of D_INS will not be statistically significant. 
 Additionally, the investors’ sentiment towards the equity markets at the launch of the 
fund should be considered. Two opposite, but not mutually exclusive, scenarios are possible. 
On the one hand, we may expect incentive provisions to become more common after a strong 
stock market rally. Managers find it easier to increase the price of their service by charging 
performance fees on top of standard management fees. Investors are enticed to subscribe fund 
shares by a more immediate perception of a potentially hefty return. Alternatively, managers 
may rely more on incentive provisions as a form of revenue sharing to entice investors into 
the funds in a more risk-averse and cost conscious environment ensuing a market bust.
8
 To 
account for both possibilities, we introduce two dummy variables. D_POS, meant to capture a 
positive market sentiment, is set equal to one whenever the return on the stock market 
relevant to the fund investment policy in the twelve months up to its start date is at least 20%. 
D_NEG, meant to capture a negative market sentiment, is set equal to one whenever this 
return is negative.
9
 A positive and significant coefficient of D_POS and D_NEG would lend 
credibility, respectively, to the first and second scenarios described. 
 The one variable to be considered according to a purely economic perspective is the 
ability of the manager with respect to his peers, as measured by the standardized fund’s 
performance realized over a two-year period (January 2005-December 2006) as defined by 
                                                 
8
 Some of the managers we interviewed pointed out the first scenario. One of the referees suggested the second. 
9
 We measure stock market returns using the MSCI Standard Indices. For equity funds with a geographical 
focus, we use the MSCI Index for that area/country. For funds with no geographical specification of their 
investment (sector equity funds, hybrid funds and total return funds), we use the MSCI World Index. Results for 
the estimated coefficients for these variables are robust to a weakening of the threshold to +15% for D_POS and 
+3% for D_NEG. 
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the ratio between the annualized monthly return and standard deviation (REWARD/RISK). 
The standardized measure is obtained as: 
 
RR
i
i
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where RRi is the reward/risk ratio for fund i, ARR is the average reward/risk ratio for all funds 
sharing the same investment objective, and RR is the standard deviation of the reward/risk 
ratio considered across all funds. Should the incentive fee serve as a valid signal for good 
managers, we would expect funds with incentive fee provisions in 2004 to show, on average, 
a superior ability over the following two-year period. 
 Another variable to be considered purely from an economic perspective is the fund’s 
investment objective as detected by a list of dummy variables taking a value of one if it is 
equity industry specific (D_INDSP), foreign equity geographically targeted (D_GEO), total 
return (D_TRET), hybrid (D_HYB), corporate bonds (D_CORP), total return bonds only 
(D_TRETBOND), specialty bonds only (D_OTHBOND), long-term treasury bonds in euro 
(D_MLTB), short-term treasury bonds in euro (D_STSTB), or money market (D_MMF). The 
default case relates to equity funds investing in the Italian market. Should performance fees 
arise from efficient contracting, the probability of their occurrence should fall as we move 
down the previously mentioned list of types of funds due to the higher cross-correlation 
existing among the assets included in their investable universe. 
 Each logistic model is meant to test a different competing hypothesis, or combination 
thereof, on the rationale for performance fees. Model 1 tests the signaling hypothesis 
including as the explanatory variable the reward-to-risk ratio. Model 2 is based on the 
contracting hypothesis encompassing all the dummy variables stating the investment 
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objective of the funds. Model 3 provides a unified view of the economic perspective on the 
rationale for performance fees, combining Models 1 and 2. Model 4 is derived from the 
managerial perspective of strategic pricing. Its explanatory variables are LOG(SIZE), 
LOG(IC_SIZE), SALES_FEE, MAINT_FEE, D_LOADS, the dummies related to the 
ownership structure of the investment companies (D_INS, D_CONS, and D_IND), as well as 
those related to the market conditions at the time the funds were established (D_POS and 
D_NEG). Model 5 includes all twenty-one explanatory variables, the complete list of which 
is shown in Table IV, Panel A. 
 
Insert Table IV about here. 
 
Due to missing values for some of these variables, the size of the sample used to run the 
logistic models decreases from 970 to 882 funds, with a corresponding coverage ratio of 
91%. The variable with the most missing data is REWARD/RISK. Because of mergers, of the 
970 funds active at the end of 2004, 39 disappeared over the following two years. 
 In estimating our models, we should also consider that the funds in our sample are 
managed by 51 investment companies with an average of 19 funds per company. It is 
reasonable to assume that funds managed by the same company may form a cluster sharing 
some similarities not captured by our models. The presence of unexplained intra-cluster 
correlation does not bias the estimates, but may overstate the significance of the coefficients. 
To control for this effect, we estimate our models allowing for intra-cluster correlation 
(between the residuals and the explanatory variables) while assuming zero correlation among 
clusters (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
V. The Whys of Incentive Provisions 
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 Table V provides the results for each logistic model, as well as for an OLS regression 
model in which the management fee is determined as a function of the same set of 
independent variables. 
 
Insert Table V about here. 
 
The results from Model 1 do not provide significant support for the role of incentive fee 
provisions as a signaling device for managers’ abilities. Its explanatory power is negligible as 
it has a Nagerlarke pseudo R
2
 less than 1%.
10
 There is no significant relation between the 
adoption of a pay for performance compensation scheme and the subsequent funds’ risk-
adjusted performance. Despite the poor results of this model, the possibility that an incentive 
fee may serve as a signal cannot be completely ruled out. In theory, a signaling equilibrium 
would still be possible with good managers separating themselves from bad managers 
through reward schemes with a stronger bias in favor of the incentive fee at the expense of 
the management fee. 
Model 2 is related to the efficient contracting hypothesis. It demonstrates a better explanatory 
power with a Nagerlake pseudo R
2
 equal to 17.7%. The estimated coefficients follow the 
expected pattern. As we move from funds investing in an asset class of securities with low 
cross-correlation (equity and total return funds) to funds whose purchasable assets are more 
cross-correlated (starting from total return bond, corporate bond, hybrid, medium and long-
term treasury bond funds, and ending up with short-term treasury bonds and money market 
funds), the tendency to use incentive fees strongly decays. 
 As revealed by the last column of Table V, a similar pecking order is found in terms 
of the impact these variables have on the management fee. Thus, the pricing of the asset 
                                                 
10
 As the R
2
 of the standard OLS regression, the Nagerlake pseudo R
2
 of a logistic model ranges from 0-1. 
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management service is set in a way to closely mirror the potential added value that the asset 
managers may generate for the investors. In this respect, of the two components of the asset 
management service, stock picking appears to be valued more than market timing. All types 
of equity funds carry, on average, a higher management fee than hybrid and total return funds 
do, while showing a probability at least as high to charge performance fees. Moreover, in the 
equity category, the ability to manage both sector-specific and foreign-targeted funds appears 
to be more valuable than the ability to invest in Italian stocks since they command a 
statistically significantly higher reward in terms of management fees with no differences in 
the probability of charging performance fees. 
 Model 3 combines Models 1 and 2 to assess the overall explanatory power of 
interpreting performance fee schemes as an economically efficient solution in a fully rational 
asset management industry plagued by asymmetric information. All results are confirmed and 
Model 3 has no gain in terms of explanatory power with respect to Model 2. 
 Model 4 provides a test for the strategic pricing hypothesis derived under a 
managerial perspective. The improvement in explanatory power is remarkable. The 
Nagerlake pseudo R
2
 climbs to 31.2% and the pattern of estimated coefficients is as expected. 
The novel managerial approach we propose appears to be superior to the traditional economic 
efficiency approach in explaining the decision to rely on incentive fees to reward fund 
managers. 
 The higher the cost of the distribution channel for an investment company in terms of 
both sales fees (net of earned loads) and maintenance fees, the lower the probability that its 
funds carry an incentive provision. At the same time we observe an increase in the size of the 
management fee, and both results are significant at the 5% level. When facing a more 
burdensome cost structure, risk-averse managers demonstrate a desire to lower the 
uncertainty of their income structure, foregoing the possibility of earning more volatile 
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performance fees in exchange for a higher and more stable stream of management fees. If so, 
in theory, we should also expect load funds to show a higher propensity to rely on 
performance fees when compared with no loads since distribution costs are, at least partially, 
directly paid for by the investors. We find a result that apparently supports this argument, 
even if at a low level of statistical significance (10%). The result is surprising, however, 
given the marginal economic relevance of loads in the Italian fund market. In order to solve 
this contradiction we have to consider that Model 4 does not control for fund categories and 
so a spurious correlation may be at work here since both incentive provisions and loads are 
more common among equity and total return funds. 
 Larger investment companies appear to exploit their market power by showing a 
significantly higher propensity to charge incentive fees than do smaller ones without 
significantly decreasing the level of their management fee as shown in the last column of 
Table V. This evidence also fits well with the claim that larger companies are more willing to 
base part of their compensation on incentive provisions due to the stronger diversification 
effect they enjoy by managing a larger number of funds. The market power hypothesis does 
not find similar support at the fund level. The size of the fund is not related to the probability 
of finding an incentive provision in the manager’s compensation scheme, nor does it show 
any significant effect on the level of management fee. 
 The ownership structure of the investment companies is also highly statistically 
significant in determining the pricing of the asset management services. Investment 
companies that are part of an insurance group do not significantly differ from those belonging 
to banking groups when setting both performance and management fees for their funds. As 
expected, the companies co-owned by several less profit oriented mutual banks show a 
significantly lower propensity to adopt incentive fees. They also charge management fees 
that, on average, are appreciably lower by about fourteen basis points as compared with those 
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charged by asset managers belonging to banking and insurance groups. At the other end of 
the spectrum, independent investment companies combine a higher proclivity to set 
performance fee provisions with a softer stance on the level of management fees. For their 
funds, the latter are, on average, twenty basis points lower than those found in funds run by 
the companies which are part of a banking group. 
 The combined reading of these two discrepancies suggests that the stronger tendency 
for independent companies to charge performance fees may depend on the presence of a 
smaller scale factor in the distribution process rather than on a stronger profit motive. Since 
they cannot rely on extensive distribution networks, a positive fund performance does not 
translate into higher capital inflows as easily as it does for companies belonging to insurance 
or banking groups. Therefore, they find it more convenient to reap the benefit of a positive 
track record directly through performance fees rather than waiting for a higher income from 
management fees applied to an expanding asset base. 
 The investors’ sentiment towards the equity market, as driven by the market trend in 
place at the launch of the fund, significantly affects the probability that a new fund will carry 
performance fee provisions. Since D_POS is positive and significant at the 1% level, we find 
strong support for the hypothesis that investment companies launch funds with performance 
fees after strong market rallies to take full advantage of investors who are less cost sensitive. 
They do so without sacrificing any part of the usual management fee as D_POS shows no 
influence at all on this component of the manager’s compensation. The evidence also lends 
similar support to the opposite, but complementary, scenario depicting incentive provisions 
as revenue sharing schemes useful to attract very cautious investors following market busts. 
D_NEG demonstrates an equally positive and strongly significant influence on the 
introduction of incentive provisions, while it shows a negative, albeit not significant, impact 
on the level of management fees. 
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 Model 5 combines the previous two models. All of the explanatory variables 
contained in Model 4 and derived by the managerial approach maintain their sign and 
statistical significance with two minor exceptions. As we expected in a model that 
appropriately controls for fund types, D_LOADS turns out to be an irrelevant factor in setting 
the reward scheme for Italian fund managers. Alternatively, the size of the funds 
[LOG(SIZE)] indicates a positive and significant (at the 5% level) effect on the presence of 
an incentive provision as suggested by the pricing power hypothesis. Correspondingly, 
however, the other variable we use as a proxy of the exercise of market power, the size of the 
investment company [LOG_IC(SIZE)], loses part of its relevance and it is now significant 
only at the 5% level instead of at the 1% level, as it is in Model 4. 
 In Model 5, the fund category attribution sees its statistical significance weakened 
when compared with the results of Model 3 derived from the economic efficiency approach. 
The tendency to introduce performance fees appears to be similar across all fund categories. 
The only exception consists of the funds aimed at investing either in money market 
instruments or in plain medium and long-term government bonds for which the parameters 
remain significantly negative, denoting a lower probability of detecting an incentive 
provision. 
 When combined, the managerial and the economic approaches we investigated are, to 
some extent, complementary as indicated by the pseudo R
2
 reaching in Model 5 a value of 
0.41. The results of Model 5, however, leave no doubt that performance provisions in mutual 
funds arise more as the product of a strategic pricing policy pursued by the managers 
promoting the funds than as an optimal response to both an efficient contracting problem and 
a signaling problem in an imperfect information setting. 
 The analysis conducted so far encompasses all categories of mutual funds and relies 
on a series of dummy variables to capture any category attribution effect. Nonetheless, this 
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mixing of fund categories may cloud the results. Some of the explanatory variables we 
employ are correlated with fund categories and some categories have far fewer incentive 
provisions than others. So, to some extent, there is the risk that some of the effects we detect 
are just picking up fund categories. 
 To verify the robustness of our results, we test similar logistic models only on our 
subsample of 381 equity funds. To control for the large variety of their investment mandate, 
we introduce a series of dummy variables with self-explanatory names aimed to capture any 
effects resulting from the attribution of each fund to a different Assogestioni equity 
subcategory. They are detailed in Table IV, Panel B. The default case still relates to equity 
funds investing only in the Italian stock market. 
 The results, illustrated in Table VI, provide a full validation of the empirical evidence 
revealed by looking at our full sample of funds. 
 
Insert Table VI about here. 
 
The managerial approach entirely maintains its explanatory power. The economic approach 
appears to be even more inadequate to explain the adoption of incentive provisions due to the 
persistent failure of the signaling hypothesis and the difference among equity fund 
subcategories appears to be not meaningful enough from an efficient contracting perspective. 
In fact, the dummy variables related to the equity fund subcategories are largely insignificant 
in explaining the adoption of incentive provisions. 
 By comparing the last column of Tables V and VI, we also find confirmation of the 
significant effects on the size of the management fee carried by the cost and ownership 
structure of the investment companies we already detected for the whole sample of funds. 
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The results in Table VI also reveal that equity funds targeting a specific sector command a 
higher management fee, on average, than equity funds with a geographical target. 
 
VI. The Effects of Incentive Fees 
 Previous theoretical studies warn about the moral hazard risk performance provisions 
may generate. Because of this danger, policymakers in the U.S. outlawed bonus plans in 
1970, making the adoption of a performance fee an extremely unusual form of reward for 
asset managers (Golec and Starks, 2004). Lacking the data, however, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no other empirical investigations concerning opportunistic behavior 
induced by asymmetric performance fees actually taking place. The evidence regarding the 
Italian market can help to fill this void. We confine our analysis to the subsample of equity 
funds as they are the ones most exposed to the risk of moral hazard. 
 Asset managers may indulge in three types of opportunistic behavior due to a reward 
scheme based on an asymmetric performance fee: 1) they may increase the risk of the fund, 
especially if no appropriate correction for it is adopted in calculating the incentive fee as 
happens in the Italian mutual fund industry that we analyze (standard asset substitution risk); 
2) they may manage a portfolio of funds with identical investment objectives taking care to 
minimize their funds’ correlations to stabilize their income from performance fees (portfolio 
asset substitution risk); or 3) they may alter, according to the fund’s realized performance, the 
risk profile of the fund when approaching the end of the incentive fee calculation period 
(dynamic asset substitution risk). 
 To test for the possibility that asset managers react to an asymmetric performance fee 
scheme that provides no correction for risk by selecting excessively aggressive investment 
strategies, we run a linear model whose dependent variable is the annualized monthly 
standard deviation of the funds’ returns from January 2005-December 2006. The explanatory 
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variables consist of a dummy (D_INC FEE) set equal to one if the fund charges an incentive 
fee, the management fee (MAN FEE), plus a list of additional variables defined in the 
previous section and designed to control for the size of the investment company 
[LOG(IC_SIZE)], for the ownership structure of the investment company (D_INS, D_CONS, 
and D_IND) and for the subcategories employed by Assogestioni to partition the equity funds 
with respect to their specific investment objectives. 
 The same linear model is also run for funds’ returns and for funds’ reward-to-risk 
ratio to provide a more complete assessment of the effect of the manager’s reward scheme. 
As Table VII indicates, when earning incentive fees, managers increase fund volatility 
adding, on average, 2.6 percentage points to their annualized standard deviation. This effect, 
however, fails to be significant at the usual levels (p-value of 0.18). The incentive fee 
provision is even less significantly related to the funds’ average rate of return. Its positive 
effect of 0.6% per year suggested by the point estimate confirms a p-value of 0.676. 
 
Insert Table VII about here. 
 
 On the whole, while limited to a very narrow time frame (two years of data from 
January 2005-December 2006), but extending to almost 400 equity funds, the evidence 
suggests that incentive provisions have no effect on the welfare of the investors. As shown in 
the third column of Table VII, the negative point estimate for the variable Reward-to-Risk 
Ratio fails to reach significance once all other relevant variables have been controlled for. 
 The size of the management fee is equally lacking a statistically significant 
explanatory power on both funds’ risk and funds’ return. Contrary to incentive provisions, 
however, the point estimates suggest higher management fees are associated with an increase 
in the funds’ standard deviation and a decrease in the funds’ average returns. Since they are 
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both welfare decreasing effects from the investor’s perspective, the negative impact of the 
management fee size on the reward-to-risk ratio equity funds deliver successfully passes the 
test of statistical significance (p-value of 0.002). 
 We now turn to the risk that an investment company may exploit opportunistically 
asymmetric performance fee provisions offering several funds with a similar risk/return 
profile and a similar investment universe, while managing them in such a way as to minimize 
the correlation in their rate of return. The risk arises because of the asymmetric nature of the 
bonus plan. By diversifying portfolio choices among comparable funds, managers may 
stabilize their incentive fee stream of income, cashing in fees from the successful funds while 
incurring no financial loss from the others. 
 To assess how material the portfolio asset substitution risk is, we measure the average 
correlation between funds that share the same investment objective, charge an incentive fee, 
and are managed by the same investment company. We then compare this correlation with 
the average correlation of random groups of funds with the same investment objective 
available to investors. 
 Despite being theoretically relevant, this moral hazard risk does not materialize in our 
sample, as Table VIII indicates. Across the 12 different categories of equity funds considered 
and the 51 investment companies operating in Italy, in just one case (one investment 
company managing a group of six different European equity funds) the average correlation 
among funds with bonus plans, similar investment objectives, and run by the same company 
demonstrates a correlation significantly lower than that which appears to be standard for that 
fund category (0.887 against 0.938 with the difference significant at the 5% level). In all 
other instances, this difference is either not significant or it appears to be significant, but in 
the opposite direction. If anything, investment companies tend to replicate the same 
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investment strategies on all similar funds with incentive provisions that they manage; exactly 
the opposite of what was feared. 
 
Insert Table VIII About Here. 
 
There are also fears that, while approaching the fee calculation date, the manager may shift a 
fund’s risk profile according to the fund performance accrued until then during the fee 
calculation period. To test how material this risk is in the real world, in the spirit of Brown, 
Harlow, and Starks (1996), we consider the equity funds that charge an annual synchronous 
incentive fee on the spread between their returns and a reference portfolio, either their 
benchmark or an index of mutual funds returns. We estimate the spread volatility over 
different time windows, the x trading days preceding and following the calculation date, with 
x = 20, 40, 60 days. We then calculate the ratio between the spread volatility over a period of 
identical length prior to and following each calculation date. Brown et al. (1996) labeled this 
metric "risk adjustment ratio". Ratios greater (smaller) than one mean that the fund runs a 
higher (lower) spread volatility toward the end of its current calculation period than it does at 
the start of the next one. 
 For each fund and each calculation period, we track the cumulated absolute active 
return from the corresponding start date. Funds with lower absolute active returns (Rp-RB) 
are "close to the benchmark". They offer their asset manager a strong incentive to increase 
the spread volatility when approaching the calculation date. The option embedded in the 
performance fee is almost "at the money", carrying a very high vega. Since after each 
calculation date, a fresh start in determining the new incentive fee occurs, we expect to find a 
higher risk adjustment ratio in funds which are close to the benchmark and carry a high vega 
when nearing the calculation date. 
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 To test the relation between the vega of the option implied in a performance fee 
provision and the possibility of an opportunistic risk shift when approaching the end of the 
calculation period, we build a two-by-two table in which funds are divided according to their 
absolute cumulative active return since the start date and the size of the risk adjustment ratio 
around the final calculation date. Since we use the median values of the two distributions as 
cutting points, should asset managers refrain from any opportunistic behavior, the null 
hypothesis of independence between the two variables would hold and the observations 
would spread evenly (25% frequency) in every cell of the table. Conversely, if the asset 
managers act opportunistically, we would expect the observations to cluster in two of the four 
cells of the table: 1) close to the benchmark – high risk adjustment ratio and 2) far from the 
benchmark – low risk adjustment ratio. We also perform a similar analysis replacing the 
spread volatility with the reciprocal of the correlation between a fund and its hurdle variable 
as the measure of risk. 
 Regardless of the risk metrics used, the results shown in Table IX do not support the 
theoretical claim that the vega of the option embedded in the performance fee generates a 
dynamic asset substitution effect. In both cases, the chi-square test on the two-way table does 
not reject the null hypothesis of the absence of any opportunistic behavior. If anything, on the 
shorter assessment period considered of just twenty days, inspection of the two-by-two table 
suggests that funds nearing the calculation date with a high vega tend to end the calculation 
period with a lower risk than the one they bear at the beginning of the next calculation period. 
The clustering of the observations, however, is not such as to generate statistically significant 
results. 
 
Insert Table IX About Here. 
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VII. Summary and Conclusions 
 Thanks to the experience of Italy, a country where until 2006 there was only one 
minor regulatory constraint on the permissible structure of the reward scheme for mutual 
fund managers, we are able to test some relevant hypotheses on the determinants and effects 
of pay-for-performance arrangements in the mutual fund industry. Such a free contracting 
environment is in stark contrast with the experience of the U.S. where an invasive regulation, 
permitting only fulcrum fee provisions, has driven almost all managers toward compensation 
schemes based exclusively on management fees. 
 In a free contracting environment, performance provisions are a typical element of the 
pay package of mutual fund managers always in the form of a bonus plan. There are, 
however, huge differences in their rate of utilization across different categories of mutual 
funds. While these provisions are industry standard for both equity and total return funds, 
they are a rarity among money market funds. Bonds and hybrid funds stand in-between. 
 There is no evidence supporting the hypothesis that incentive fee provisions serve as a 
signaling tool that good investment managers use to separate themselves from bad ones. They 
do not appear to be a costly device for the equity and total return managers making them 
ineffective as a signal of investment ability. 
 The evidence is more supportive of the role of incentive provision as a device for 
optimal contracting aimed at disciplining the moral hazard risk arising from managers whose 
effort is unobservable. From this perspective, however, the choice of some funds to compute 
the performance fee on their return in excess of hurdle variables that carry no relation at all to 
their investment mandate is questionable and puzzling. 
 Performance provisions appear to emerge mostly as the product of strategic pricing 
policies pursued by the investment companies. They are more common among funds 
managed by companies driven by a strong profit motive, as well as among those who cannot 
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leverage the benefit of their positive performance through an extensive distribution network 
to gain massive new inflows of funds. They are also more common among funds launched 
during strong and sustained stock market rallies, which probably make retail investors less 
concerned about the cost structure of the asset management services. Smaller asset managers, 
as well as those bearing the burden of more expensive distribution channels, are less keen on 
performance fee provisions. Because of their risk aversion, they prefer to rely on the more 
stable flow guaranteed by the management fee. 
 We find no significant evidence that asset managers, responding opportunistically to 
the incentive provided for by the fee provision, pursue inappropriate investment policies 
designed to optimize their revenue stream rather than their funds’ risk/return profile. Funds 
with incentive provision demonstrate higher risk and higher return than do comparable funds 
without it, but neither result passes the test of statistical significance. There is also no 
evidence that managers rewarded with a bonus plan purposely diversify the investment 
strategies of their funds with similar mandates to stabilize the flow of their performance fees. 
The same can be said with respect to the risk that opportunistic managers may adjust the risk-
return profile of their funds when approaching the performance fee calculation date either to 
lower the risk and lock in the realized out performance or to increase the risk hoping to 
recover the realized under performance before the calculation period ends. The risk of losing 
their reputational capital and of seeing their AUM shrink appears to make investment 
companies aware that their payoff is not as asymmetrical as it would seem should we focus 
just on the incentive provision. 
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Table I. The Italian Mutual Fund Industry 
 
The table illustrates the structure of the Italian mutual fund industry as at the end of 2004 (Assogestioni, 2004). 
 
Panel A: Industry Breakdown for Number of Funds 
Investment 
Company 
No. of Inv. 
Companies 
Percentage of Managed Funds of Different Type 
Total Number  
of Funds 
Equity Hybrid 
Tot. 
Ret. 
Money Bonds Number % 
Insurance 4 50.9% 6.5% 8.3% 3.7% 30.6% 108 11.1% 
Commercial Banks 29 41.5% 10.4% 6.1% 4.5% 37.5% 661 68.1% 
Cooperative Banks 2 47.7% 6.8% 2.3% 6.8% 36.4% 44 4.5% 
Independent 16 45.2% 4.4% 13.4% 4.5% 32.5% 157 16.2% 
Total Sample 51 43.4% 8.9% 7.3% 4.5% 35.9% 970 100.0% 
Panel B: Industry Breakdown for Assets Under Management (AUM) 
Investment 
Company 
Companies 
AUM for Type of Funds Total AUM 
Equity Hybrid 
Tot. 
Ret. 
Money Bonds € - Millions % 
Insurance 4 33.1% 6.4% 3.6% 3.0% 53.9% 18,498.32 5.2% 
Commercial Banks 29 17.7% 8.0% 1.7% 24.3% 48.3% 292,273.02 81.8% 
Cooperative Banks 2 21.9% 15.2% 0.3% 25.6% 37.0% 27,575.28 7.7% 
Independent 16 25.9% 11.9% 19.7% 15.5% 27.0% 18,908.20 5.3% 
Total Sample 51 19.3% 8.7% 2.6% 22.8% 46.6% 357,254.82 100.0% 
Panel C: Average Management Fee 
Investment 
Company 
No. of Inv. 
Companies 
Average Management Fee for Type of Funds  
Equity Hybrid 
Tot. 
Ret. 
Money Bonds 
Total 
Sample 
 
Insurance 4 1.94% 1.63% 1.44% 0.50% 1.19% 1.60%  
Commercial Banks 29 1.94% 1.60% 1.63% 0.55% 1.01% 1.47%  
Cooperative Banks 2 1.82% 1.43% 1.80% 0.52% 1.00% 1.43%  
Independent 16 1.60% 1.37% 1.51% 0.57% 0.93% 1.31%  
Total Sample 51 1.88% 1.58% 1.57% 0.55% 1.02% 1.46%  
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Table II. Incentive Fees in the Italian Mutual Fund Industry 
 
The table illustrates to what extent the Italian mutual fund industry was making use of performance fee provisions at the end 
of 2004. The data on assets under management (AUM) are from Assogestioni (2004). Data on incentive fees were hand 
collected from the funds’ prospectuses. 
 
Fund Category  
Number 
of Funds 
AUM 
(Millions of €) 
 Funds that Charge Incentive Fees 
    
As a % of the 
Number of 
Funds 
As a % of AUM 
Equity 421 68,832.04  82.9% 87.4% 
Hybrid 86 31,207.09  67.4% 72.0% 
Bond 348 166,353.93  52.6% 45.7% 
Money Market 44 81,542.89  9.1% 3.8% 
Total Return 71 9,318.87  82.9% 79.7% 
Total 970 357,254.82  67.3% 48.0% 
 
 43 
Table III. The Size of Management Fees 
 
The table demonstrates the average size of the management fee across different categories of Italian mutual funds with and 
without incentive fees. The test of equal means under the assumption of unknown, but equal variance is also reported. 
 
Fund Category 
Without 
Incentive Fee 
With Incentive 
Fee 
Full Sample P-Value 
Equity Funds 1.85% 1.90% 1.89% 0.302 
Hybrid Funds 1.51% 1.61% 1.58% 0.261 
Bond Funds 0.97% 1.08% 1.03% 0.002 
Money Market Funds 0.54% 0.63% 0.55% 0.447 
Flexible Funds 1.47% 1.60% 1.58% 0.369 
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Table IV.Description of the Full Set of Potential Explanatory Variables for Performance Fee Provisions 
 
Variable  Description 
Panel A 
REWARD/RISK 
 Ratio between the fund return and its standard deviation from January 2005-December 2006 minus the average 
ratio of funds with the same investment objective divided by the cross-sectional standard deviation of ratios 
within the investment objective. 
LOG(SIZE)  Natural logarithm of the size of the mutual fund. 
D_MMF  Dummy variable equal to one when the fund is invested in euro-denominated money market instruments. 
D_STEB  Dummy variable equal to one when the fund is invested in short-term euro-denominated government bonds. 
D_MLTEB 
 Dummy variable equal to one when the fund is invested in medium and long-term euro-denominated 
government bonds. 
D_CORP  Dummy variable equal to one when the fund is invested in corporate bonds. 
D_OTHBOND  Dummy variable equal to one when the fund is a bond fund that does not fit into any other bond category. 
D_TRETBOND  Dummy variable equal to one when the fund is a total return fund invested in bonds. 
D_HYB  Dummy variable equal to one when the fund is a hybrid fund. 
D_GEO  Dummy variable equal to one when the fund is geographically targeted on foreign equities. 
D_INDSP  Dummy variable equal to one when the fund is equity industry specific. 
D_TRET  Dummy variable equal to one when the fund is a total return fund. 
LOG(IC_SIZE)  Natural logarithm of the total asset under management for the investment company that manages the fund. 
SALES_FEES 
 Ratio between the sales fee paid by the investment company to the distribution channel (minus the loads 
earned) when new assets are invested in the fund and the total assets are under management of the investment 
company. 
MAINT_FEES 
 Ratio between the maintenance fees paid by the investment company to the sales channel every year on the 
existing AUM and the total assets under management of the investment company. 
D_LOADS  Dummy variable equal to one if the fund charges front- or back-end loads. 
D_INS  Dummy variable equal to one when the investment company is owned by an insurance company. 
D_CONS  Dummy variable equal to one when the investment company is owned by a consortium of mutual banks. 
D_IND 
 Dummy variable equal to one when the investment company is independent or is not owned by a subject with a 
proprietary distribution channel in Italy. 
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Table IV.Description of the Full Set of Potential Explanatory Variables for Performance Fee Provisions 
(Continued) 
 
Variable  Description 
D_POS 
 Dummy variable equal to one for equity, hybrid or total return funds when the return of the market in which 
they are invested has been, in the year prior to the creation of the fund, higher than 20%. 
D_NEG 
 Dummy variable equal to one for equity, hybrid, or total return funds when the return of the market in which 
they are invested has been, in the year prior to the creation of the fund, lower than -20%. 
 
Panel B: Dummy Variables Representing Assogestioni Classification of the Fund in an Equity Subcategory  
D_Euro Zone  = 1 if the fund is invested in Euro Zone equities. 
D_European Eq.  = 1 if the fund is invested in European equities. 
D_USA Eq.  = 1 if the fund is invested in U.S. equities. 
D_Pacific Eq.  = 1 if the fund is invested in Pacific area equities. 
D_Emerging Markets  = 1 if the fund is invested in emerging market equities. 
D_International Eq.  = 1 if the fund is invested in international equities. 
D_Country Specific  = 1 if the fund is targeting stocks listed in a specific country. 
D_Consumer Goods  = 1 if the fund is invested in consumer goods stocks. 
D_Energy  = 1 if the fund is invested in energy stocks. 
D_Finance  = 1 if the fund is invested in stocks of financial corporations. 
D_Health Care  = 1 if the fund is invested in health care stocks. 
D_ Information Tech.  = 1 if the fund is invested in IT stocks. 
D_Telecom. Services  = 1 if  the fund is invested in telecom service stocks. 
D_Other Industries  = 1 if the fund belongs to a remaining industry-specific category. 
D_Other  = 1 if none of the above applies and the fund is not targeting the Italian stock market (default case). 
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Table V. The Causes of Performance Fee Provisions 
 
The results of five logistic models that aspire to explain performance fee provisions are shown below. The independent 
variables are described in Panel A of Table IV. The last column indicates the results of an OLS model intended to explain 
the management fee using the same set of variables. Data on funds’ characteristics at the end of 2004 are from Assogestioni 
(2004). Standard Errors have been estimated by clustering the observations within investment companies. Significance at the 
1%, 5%, 10% levels is marked by ***, **, *, respectively. Since 88 funds out of a population of 970 show data missing for 
at least one of the variables considered, models are run on a reduced sample of 882 funds. t-stats in parenthesis. 
 
 
Model 1 
(Signaling) 
Model 2 
(Optimal 
Contract) 
Model 3 
M1+M2 
Model 4 
(Strategic 
Pricing) 
Model 5 
(Global) 
Management 
Fee 
Constant 0.824 1.695 1.707 -2.403 -1.676 1.778 
 (3.306)*** (3.647)*** (3.612)*** (1.545) (0.952) (10.935)*** 
REWARD/RISK -0.142  -0.092  -0.261 -0.044 
 (1.464)  (0.848)  (2.477)** (3.028)*** 
D_MMF  -3.369 -3.315  -3.835 -1.146 
  (6.252)*** (6.356)***  (6.734)*** (20.219)*** 
D_STEB  -2.076 -2.085  -2.186 -1.009 
  (4.236)*** (4.198)***  (4.471)*** (19.433)*** 
D_MLTEB  -1.289 -1.329  -1.206 -0.742 
  (2.838)*** (2.829)***  (2.358)** (18.020)*** 
D_CORP  -1.346 -1.363  -0.900 -0.581 
  (2.455)** (2.465)**  (1.521) (10.655)*** 
D_OTHBOND  -1.135 -1.170  -0.878 -0.608 
  (1.968)** (1.986)**  (1.387) (11.384)*** 
D_TRETBOND  -0.972 -0.982  -0.592 -0.681 
  (2.184)** (2.167)**  (1.212) (20.500)*** 
D_HYB  -0.982 -0.994  -0.769 -0.236 
  (2.652)*** (2.636)***  (1.615) (4.441)*** 
D_GEO  -0.085 -0.088  -0.007 0.082 
  (0.294) (0.302)  (0.020) (1.750)* 
D_INDSP  -0.442 -0.501  0.158 0.121 
  (0.689) (0.765)  (0.305) (2.390)** 
D_TRET  -0.161 -0.171  -0.224 -0.142 
  (0.269) (0.283)  (0.334) (2.333)** 
LOG(SIZE)    -0.018 0.212 0.004 
    (0.230) (2.511)** (0.297) 
LOG(IC_SIZE)    0.417 0.362 -0.029 
    (2.705)*** (2.051)** (1.003) 
MAINT_FEES    -180.136 -206.171 30.945 
    (2.072)** (2.039)** (3.310)*** 
SALES_FEES    -219.451 -269.180 34.669 
    (2.322)** (2.609)*** (3.718)*** 
D_LOADS    0.828 0.515 0.072 
    (1.830)* (1.083) (1.062) 
D_INS    -0.656 -0.748 0.018 
    (1.093) (1.140) (0.276) 
D_CONS    -1.755 -2.130 -0.139 
    (2.165)** (2.470)** (3.411)*** 
D_IND    2.462 2.856 -0.202 
    (2.969)*** (3.319)*** (3.276)*** 
D_POS    1.786 1.132 0.008 
    (3.483)*** (2.516)** (0.248) 
D_NEG    1.255 0.602 -0.009 
    (3.827)*** (1.982)** (0.185) 
No. of 
Observations 
882 882 882 882 882 882 
Pseudo R2 0.0058 0.1765 0.1781 0.3123 0.4136 0.6940 
 47 
  
 48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI. The Causes of Performance Fee Provisions for Equity Funds 
 
The results of five logistic models that aspire to explain performance fee provisions for equity funds are shown. The 
independent variables are described in Panels A and B of Table VI. The last column illustrates the results of an OLS model 
designed to explain the management fee using the same set of variables. Data on funds’ characteristics at the end of 2004 are 
from Assogestioni (2004). Standard Errors have been estimated by clustering the observations within investment companies. 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels is marked by ***, **, *, respectively. t-stats in parenthesis. 
 
 
Model 1 
(Signaling) 
Model 2 
(Optimal 
Contract) 
Model 3 
M1+M2 
Model 4 
(Strategic 
Pricing) 
Model 5 
(Global) 
Management 
Fee 
Constant 1.562 1.812 1.814 -2.478 -3.255 1.707 
 (3.833)*** (3.533)*** (3.502)*** (0.793) (1.090) (7.579)*** 
REWARD/RISK -0.024  -0.011  -0.548 -0.030 
 (0.142)  (0.054)  (2.082)** (1.958)* 
D_Euro Zone  -0.254 -0.247  -0.212 0.071 
  (0.401) (0.359)  (0.278) (0.833) 
D_European Eq.  0.092 0.090  -0.326 0.003 
  (0.382) (0.366)  (0.625) (0.047) 
D_USA Eq.  0.439 0.437  0.675 0.022 
  (0.683) (0.678)  (0.639) (0.393) 
D_Pacific Eq.  0.203 0.198  -0.414 0.002 
  (0.308) (0.298)  (0.393) (0.037) 
D_Emerging Markets  -0.308 -0.307  0.537 0.160 
  (0.730) (0.703)  (0.634) (2.758)*** 
D_International Eq.  -0.407 -0.408  -0.046 0.075 
  (1.137) (1.140)  (0.079) (1.137) 
D_Country Specific  -1.995 -1.994  -1.013 0.438 
  (2.613)*** (2.583)***  (1.429) (3.619)*** 
D_Consumer Goods  -0.896 -0.896  0.876 0.278 
  (1.028) (1.028)  (1.260) (3.352)*** 
D_Energy  -1.119 -1.116  0.025 0.198 
  (1.317) (1.284)  (0.042) (2.831)*** 
D_Finance  -0.560 -0.572  -0.162 0.153 
  (0.714) (0.770)  (0.294) (2.273)** 
D_Health Care  -1.119 -1.134  -0.300 0.147 
  (1.447) (1.456)  (0.405) (2.226)** 
D_ Information Tech.  0.490 0.470  0.797 0.129 
  (0.539) (0.462)  (0.526) (2.075)** 
D_Telecom. Services  -0.714 -0.725  -1.074 0.029 
  (0.703) (0.696)  (1.633) (0.348) 
D_Other Industries  -0.346 -0.347  1.168 0.195 
  (0.424) (0.426)  (1.648)* (3.074)*** 
D_Other  -0.426 -0.427  1.359 0.076 
  (0.478) (0.474)  (1.060) (1.069) 
LOG(SIZE)    0.586 0.800 0.035 
    (3.394)*** (4.273)*** (1.537) 
LOG(IC_SIZE)    0.492 0.509 -0.025 
    (1.871)* (2.025)** (0.641) 
MAINT_FEES    -423.625 -454.669 30.628 
    (3.571)*** (3.835)*** (2.673)** 
SALES_FEES    -384.259 -435.344 27.657 
    (2.087)** (2.511)** (2.720)*** 
D_LOADS    0.337 0.430 0.021 
    (0.417) (0.561) (0.236) 
D_CONS    -3.826 -4.448 -0.200 
    (3.147)*** (3.846)*** (3.565)*** 
D_IND    2.634 3.126 -0.254 
    (1.910)* (2.222)** (2.823)*** 
D_POS    0.915 1.173 -0.045 
    (1.806)* (2.032)** (1.667) 
D_NEG    0.106 0.165 -0.022 
    (0.235) (0.350) (0.490) 
No. of  Observations 381 381 381 381 381 381 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.068 0.068 0.510 0.558 0.274 
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Table VII. Standard Asset Substitution Risk 
 
The table demonstrates the results of OLS regression models explaining funds’ risk (standard deviation), return and 
reward/risk ratio. The independent variables are a dummy set equal to one if the fund charges an incentive fee (D_INC FEE), 
the management fee (MAN FEE), the natural logarithm of the size of the fund (LOG(SIZE)), three dummy variables that 
model the ownership structure of the investment company assuming a value of one whenever the company is part of an 
insurance group (D_INS), is independent (D_IND), or belongs to a consortium of mutual banks (D_CONS). The default case 
relates to investment companies belonging to banking groups. The last fifteen variables are a collection of dummy variables 
defined on the different fund objectives according to the official Assogestioni (2004) classification. Data on funds’ 
characteristics at the end of 2004 have been taken from the funds’ prospectuses. Risk and return measures have been 
calculated on monthly observations from January 2005-December 2006 and annualized. Standard Errors have been estimated 
by clustering the observations within investment companies (***, **, * for significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, 
respectively). t-stats in parenthesis. 
 
 Risk Risk Return Return Reward/Risk Reward/Risk 
 (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 
Constant 0.284 0.293 0.141 0.140 0.506 0.485 
 (10.371)*** (7.750)*** (10.871)*** (8.036)*** (19.479)*** (15.554)*** 
D_INC FEE 0.030 0.026 0.010 0.004 0.007 -0.016 
 (1.677) (1.349) (1.224) (0.417) (0.324) (0.736) 
MAN FEE 0.019 0.008 -0.001 -0.005 -0.032 -0.037 
 (1.200) (0.499) (0.113) (0.752) (2.539)** (3.282)*** 
LOG(SIZE)  0.005  0.004  0.011 
  (1.317)  (1.963)*  (2.208)** 
D_INS  -0.027  -0.020  -0.035 
  (1.198)  (1.612)  (1.567) 
D_CONS  -0.022  -0.022  -0.063 
  (1.229)  (2.281)**  (2.540)** 
D_IND  -0.017  -0.000  0.017 
  (1.023)  (0.019)  (0.826) 
D_Euro Zone -0.062 -0.057 0.007 0.009 0.090 0.096 
 (2.216)** (2.266)** (0.633) (0.930) (2.935)*** (3.176)*** 
D_European Eq. -0.082 -0.084 0.010 0.009 0.142 0.142 
 (2.832)*** (2.760)*** (1.351) (1.323) (10.810)*** (11.405)*** 
D_USA Eq. -0.038 -0.035 -0.091 -0.089 -0.275 -0.268 
 (1.318) (1.277) (12.354)*** (12.330)*** (12.082)*** (11.782)*** 
D_Pacific Eq. 0.032 0.030 -0.011 -0.011 -0.084 -0.081 
 (0.935) (0.872) (1.421) (1.335) (3.343)*** (3.167)*** 
D_Emerging 
Markets 
0.317 0.317 0.116 0.119 0.015 0.025 
 (2.609)** (2.609)** (6.936)*** (7.335)*** (0.464) (0.769) 
D_International Eq. -0.065 -0.062 -0.039 -0.035 -0.061 -0.051 
 (2.327)** (2.326)** (6.456)*** (6.092)*** (3.432)*** (2.798)*** 
D_Country Specific 0.033 0.035 0.028 0.029 0.001 0.003 
 (0.512) (0.540) (0.635) (0.655) (0.019) (0.062) 
D_Consumer Goods -0.080 -0.062 -0.058 -0.043 -0.105 -0.067 
 (2.823)*** (2.824)*** (4.778)*** (3.447)*** (2.121)** (1.411) 
D_Energy 0.068 0.079 0.026 0.035 -0.033 -0.009 
 (1.844)* (2.298)** (1.248) (1.588) (0.890) (0.217) 
D_Finance -0.068 -0.058 -0.022 -0.012 -0.005 0.020 
 (2.186)** (2.237)** (1.096) (0.684) (0.095) (0.366) 
D_Health Care -0.063 -0.058 -0.081 -0.075 -0.214 -0.193 
 (2.177)** (2.085)** (9.334)*** (8.389)*** (9.043)*** (7.422)*** 
D_Information Tech. 0.088 0.095 -0.109 -0.103 -0.366 -0.347 
 (2.080)** (2.501)** (12.346)*** (11.535)*** (14.319)*** (13.763)*** 
D_Telecom. Services -0.131 -0.125 -0.082 -0.074 -0.168 -0.145 
 (4.045)*** (4.204)*** (4.135)*** (3.877)*** (2.626)** (2.382)** 
D_Other Industries -0.064 -0.056 -0.058 -0.051 -0.127 -0.107 
 (1.932)* (1.792)* (3.151)*** (2.790)*** (2.321)** (1.975)* 
D_Other -0.056 -0.054 -0.035 -0.029 -0.049 -0.027 
 (1.799)* (1.673) (2.739)*** (2.441)** (0.957) (0.537) 
Observations 381 381 381 381 381 381 
R-Squared 0.316 0.321 0.568 0.582 0.561 0.573 
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Table VIII. Portfolio Asset Substitution Risk 
 
Each cell in the table illustrates three data. The first is the number of the investment companies (IC) managing ‘X’ funds of 
the same type charging incentive fees. The second is the average correlation among funds in each one of these groups. The 
third (in brackets) is the difference between the average correlation recorded in these groups of funds and the correlation 
found in equally populated groups of similar funds selected randomly (***, **, * for significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, 
respectively). Daily returns in 2004 are used for the estimation. In order to measure the average correlation among funds in 
the random groups, we have simulated 1,000 extractions for every investment objective and every group size. 
 
 
IC with a Portfolio of X Similar Funds and the 
Correlation Among Them 
Investment Objective X=2 X=3 X=4 X=5 X=6 
Italian Equities 
11 1  1  
0,900 0,984  0,914  
(0,111)*** (0,184)***  (0,063)**  
Euro Zone Equities 
2     
0,970     
(0,378)***     
European Equities 
5  2  1 
0,940  0,948  0,887 
(0,336)***  (0,177)***  (-0,051)** 
USA Equities 
4  2 1  
0,965  0,935 0,934  
(0,121)***  (0,061)* (0,060)**  
Pacific Equities 
7  1   
0,768  0,846   
(0,138)***  (0,191)***   
Emerging Markets Equities 
 2 1   
 0,659 0,747   
 (0,014) (0,048)   
International Equities 
6 3 1  2 
0,968 0,949 0,942  0,953 
(0,198)*** (0,128)*** (0,121)***  (0,059)** 
Other 
1     
0,937     
(0,099)     
Consumer Goods 
2     
0,848     
(0,086)***     
Energy 
1     
0,663     
(0,005)     
Information Technology 
1 1    
0,992 0,904    
(0,240)*** (0,190)***    
Other Industries 
5 1    
0,748 0,764    
(0,028) (0,034)    
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Table IX. Dynamic Asset Substitution Risk 
 
The results shown refer to the population of 158 equity mutual funds which charge a synchronous performance fee 
calculated on an annual basis as a function of either their active return or their differential return with respect to an index of 
comparable funds. Risk-adjusted ratios (RAR) are calculated as the ratio of both spread volatility (Panel A) and of the 
reciprocal of the correlation coefficient between funds’ return and their hurdle variable (Panel B) x days (assessment period) 
before and after each year’s end (performance fee calculation dates). We divide funds in a 2 × 2 table according to both their 
RAR and the size of their absolute cumulated active or differential return from the beginning of each year (from 2001-2003) 
to x days prior to the same year’s end. 2 tests for the independence of the cells in the 2 × 2 table are also reported. 
 
  Close to the Benchmark Far from the Benchmark   
Assessment 
Period 
Observations ‘High’ RAR ‘Low’ RAR ‘High’ RAR ‘Low’ RAR 
2 P-Value 
Panel A: Spread Volatility 
20 days 158 22.78 27.22 27.85 22.15 1.62 0.20 
40 days  25.95 24.05 22.78 27.22 0.63 0.43 
60 days  27.22 22.78 23.42 26.58 0.91 0.34 
Panel B: Reciprocal Linear Correlation Coefficient 
20 days 158 23.87 27.10 27.10 21.94 1.10 0.29 
40 days  25.16 25.81 24.52 24.52 0.01 0.94 
60 days  27.10 23.87 21.29 27.74 1.47 0.22 
 
